Serbia & Montenegro (1987–2007) — From Hope to Disaster

 

In most east-Euro­pe­an coun­tri­es old, new poli­ti­cal for­ces equ­ip­ped with new system of valu­es overt­hrew rigid com­mu­nist eli­te. Unli­ke that, in S&M, old, com­pro­mi­se-ori­en­ted com­mu­nist poli­ti­cal eli­te (in Ser­bia led by Ivan Stam­bo­lic) was overt­hro­wn by strong and rigid com­mu­nist regi­me of Slo­bo­dan Milo­se­vic in Ser­bia, Momir Bula­to­vic and Milo Dju­ka­no­vic in Mon­te­ne­gro. The­se two regi­mes uti­li­zed long lasting Koso­vo issue to gain public sup­port. They refu­te pea­ce­ful trans­for­ma­ti­on of Yugo­sla­via (or its pea­ce­ful dis­so­lu­ti­on with the rest of Yugo­slav repu­blics) and star­ted advo­ca­ted war poli­tics in the region.

The hope in cour­se of histo­ri­cal fall of com­mu­nism con­verts into disa­ster. The war star­ted and S&M joi­ned for­ces in mili­ta­ry events in Cro­a­tia and Bosnia & Her­ze­go­vi­na in effort to keep “all Serbs in one country”.

Inste­ad of buil­ding a new system of mar­ket eco­no­my and indi­vi­du­al fre­e­dom S&M foste­red war poli­tics. The cru­ci­al turn point in star­ting war was Mon­te­ne­gro sup­port of Milosevic’s politics.

Gene­ral Pat­tern of Ruling

Milo­se­vic, Bula­to­vic and Dju­ka­no­vic were met­ho­do­lo­gi­cal­ly old style com­mu­nists with demo­cra­tic rhetoric’s and style. They inhe­ri­ted old intel­li­gen­ce ser­vi­ces, army, and poli­ce and con­trol­led all sta­te media and gre­at majo­ri­ty of pri­va­te media. As a sup­port to Milosevic’s poli­tics wea­ke­ned, the use of sta­te for­ces and pro­pa­gan­da pro­por­ti­o­nal­ly beca­me stronger.

At the begin­ning of his poli­ti­cal rai­se Milo­se­vic had con­si­de­ra­ble sup­port from all insti­tu­ti­ons (aca­de­mia, media, church, distin­gu­is­hed intel­lec­tu­als, etc.), and had not have need to resort to more radi­cal forms of ruling. As public sup­ports wake­ned he uses more and more of sta­te appa­ra­tus to con­trol poli­ti­cal situ­a­ti­on in the coun­try. Ser­bi­an intel­li­gen­ce ser­vi­ce (DB) had its peo­ple infil­tra­ted in main oppo­si­ti­o­nal par­ti­es, media and uni­ver­si­ti­es. At the end of his reign he lost sup­port in army and poli­ce and par­tly in intelligence.

Milosevic’s dic­ta­tors­hip was soft; he uses for­ce only when he tho­ught it was neces­sa­ry in order to keep his regi­me firm in pla­ce. But this time-to-time uti­li­za­ti­on of for­ce was bru­tal; many poli­ti­cal oppo­nents were kil­led and were molested.

Sta­ged Democracy

From 1990 S&M ente­red into par­li­a­men­ta­ry demo­cra­cy, and chan­ged con­sti­tu­ti­on in order to fore­see con­se­qu­en­ces of Yugo­sla­via dissolution.

But it was sta­ged demo­cra­cy; elec­ti­ons from 1990 were neit­her free nor fair, alt­ho­ugh Milo­se­vic and his coun­ter­parts in Mon­te­ne­gro had con­si­de­ra­ble public sup­port. Oppo­si­ti­on to Milo­se­vic was not so strong and it was badly orga­ni­zed. Yugo­slav Army and Ser­bi­an Poli­ce bru­tal­ly sup­pres­sed huge demon­stra­ti­ons in Serbia’s capi­tal city Bel­gra­de in 1991.

Milo­se­vic used Yugo­slav Army both aga­inst other Yugo­slav repu­blics and dome­stic opponents.

Sta­ged Hyperinflation

Soon after bre­a­kup of Yugo­sla­via in 1992, S&M ente­red into com­mon sta­te named “Fede­ral Repu­blic of Yugo­sla­via” (FRY) and proc­la­i­med con­ti­nu­i­ty with for­mer Yugo­sla­via. UN impo­sed sanc­ti­ons to FRY  (1992) and eco­no­mi­cal and poli­ti­cal con­di­ti­ons pro­gres­si­ve­ly worsen.

In order to finan­ce mili­ta­ry poli­cy and dome­stic public spen­dings, Milosevic’s govern­ment deli­be­ra­te­ly pro­du­ced world record bra­king hype­rin­fla­ti­on (1994).  Dome­stic cur­ren­cy was rui­ned and peo­ple star­ted to spend the­ir savings in fore­ign cur­ren­cy. The regi­me badly nee­ded fresh money, and it mana­ged to get it, at the expen­se of rapid and dra­stic impo­ve­rish­ment of population.

Black mar­ket eco­no­my beca­me the main eco­no­my. Under­gro­und and the sta­te wor­ked toget­her in vari­o­us arran­ge­ments (drug, fuel, tobac­co traf­fic­king). And this bond rema­ins unc­han­ged up until the very end of Milo­se­vic regime.

War and Peace

From 1990 to 1995 S&M foste­red war poli­tics. In the begin­ning of the war they used Yugo­slav army, and later they hel­ped and sup­port mili­ta­ry for­ces of Serbs in Bosnia and Her­ze­go­vi­na and in Cro­a­tia. Both Milo­se­vic in Ser­bia and Bula­to­vic and Dju­ka­no­vic in Mon­te­ne­gro uti­li­zed war poli­tics to homo­ge­ni­ze nati­on in order to eva­de real eco­no­mi­cal and poli­ti­cal issu­es. But the pres­su­re of inter­na­ti­o­nal com­mu­ni­ty (US and EU), cata­strop­hi­cal­ly bad eco­no­mi­cal situ­a­ti­on in the coun­try, and public sup­port dec­li­ne, per­su­a­ded Milo­se­vic to sign Dayton Pea­ce Tre­a­ty. Both Milo­se­vic and his Mon­te­ne­gro col­la­bo­ra­tors took advan­ta­ge of this event, repre­sen­ted it as pea­ce vic­to­ry and took cre­dit for it.

War Lega­cy

Lega­cy of war was cri­mi­na­li­za­ti­on of the sta­te. The under­gro­und con­nec­ted with the sta­te and sta­te (=intel­li­gen­ce) ope­ra­ted with under­gro­und. Intel­li­gen­ce has its para­mi­li­ta­ry for­ces gover­ned by lea­ding men from under­gro­und, and had ope­ra­ted in Cro­a­tia and Bosnia & Her­ze­go­vi­na. Famo­us Zelj­ko Razna­to­vic “Arkan” and Milo­rad Ule­mek “Legia” were well kno­wn cri­mi­nals who ope­ra­ted for the state’s intel­li­gen­ce offi­ce (for­mer UDBA, in Milo­se­vic time DB and now BIA). The situ­a­ti­on was simi­lar in Mon­te­ne­gro, alt­ho­ugh the­re sta­te poses no para­mi­li­ta­ry for­ces, but the­re was strong link betwe­en “busi­nes­smen” and politicians.

Coa­li­ti­on Break-Up

As the pea­ce­ti­me came abo­ut, more and more have dome­stic poli­ti­cal issu­es emer­ged, and Milosevic’s poli­tics found itself on unsta­ble gro­und. Oppo­si­ti­on block beca­me stron­ger and gai­ned more public sup­port. As a result, he lost 1996 local elec­ti­ons. Oppo­si­ti­on won in almost eve­ry lar­ge city, inc­lu­ding the capi­tal. Caught by sur­pri­se and enti­re­ly unpre­pa­red, he imme­di­a­te­ly abo­lis­hed the elec­ti­on results. That trig­ge­red huge dai­ly oppo­si­ti­o­nal and student’s pea­ce­ful ral­li­es that lasted for almost three months.  In the end, as an out­co­me of dome­stic and inter­na­ti­o­nal pres­su­re Milo­se­vic recog­ni­zed elec­ti­on results, and for the first time endu­red major poli­ti­cal failure.

From 1994 and on, Dju­ka­no­vic and Bula­to­vic star­ted figh­ting over poli­ti­cal pri­ma­cy in Mon­ten­ge­ro. Dju­ka­no­vic won and this mar­ked the begin­ning of clas­hes with Milo­se­vic. At that time Dju­ka­no­vic poli­tics was in no way dif­fe­rent from Milo­se­vics, he inhe­ri­ted sta­te and poli­ce appa­ra­tus that has for long time been con­trol­led by Milo­se­vic and he con­ti­nu­ed to use it in the way that Milo­se­vic had done before.

Koso­vo Con­flict and NATO Intervention

In order to rema­in on power, Milo­se­vic did what he had kno­wn best, star­ted a new war. Alt­ho­ugh the Koso­vo issue was very old and cum­ber­so­me, Milosevic’s solu­ti­on of the cri­ses impli­ed sup­pres­si­on and radi­ca­li­za­ti­on. He mana­ged to main­ta­in pea­ce in Koso­vo by sen­ding gre­at num­ber of poli­ce units in pro­vin­ce that was just short run solu­ti­on. Inste­ad of insi­sting on dia­lo­gue betwe­en Serbs and Alba­ni­an, he repel­led mode­ra­te Koso­vo-Alba­ni­ans poli­ti­cal eli­te and intel­lec­tu­als, thus ope­ned the door for more radi­cal poli­ti­cal move­ments in Koso­vo. Gene­ral pat­tern is also sho­wn here: radi­ca­li­za­ti­on = poli­ti­cal survival.

The radi­ca­li­za­ti­on pro­du­ced para­mi­li­ta­ry for­ces of Koso­vo-Alba­ni­ans, and the war star­ted. Milo­se­vic emplo­yed tro­ops and gre­at num­ber of Koso­vo-Alba­ni­ans were for­ced to lea­ve the coun­try. This pro­vo­ked inter­na­ti­o­nal respond, and NATO star­ted with bom­bing cam­pa­ign of FRY for three months in 1999.

At the time Milo­se­vic used the situ­a­ti­on to get rid of poli­ti­cal oppo­nents in Bel­gra­de. DB orga­ni­zed assas­si­na­ti­on of famo­us oppo­si­ti­on jour­na­list Slav­ko Curu­vi­ja at the peak of NATO bom­bing. In 2000. DB assas­si­na­ted Ivan Stam­bo­lic (Milosevic’s for­mer oppo­nent and for­mer com­mu­nist pri­me mini­ster of Ser­bia) and tri­ed to assas­si­na­te at that time pro­mi­nent oppo­si­ti­o­nal lea­der Vuk Draskovic.

Pre­si­dent Dju­ka­no­vic poli­cy beca­me gra­du­al­ly more distant toward his Serbia’s coun­ter­parts. During the bom­bing cam­pa­ign he wel­co­med Zoran Djin­djic (pro­mi­nent oppo­si­ti­o­nal lea­der) as he fled Bel­gra­de in front of Milosevic’s hench­men in an effort to safe his own life.

The Koso­vo con­flict ended with sig­ning up pea­ce tre­a­ty in Kuma­no­vo (1999). Pre­si­dent Milo­se­vic lost yet anot­her war, and the last opti­on rema­i­ned. The crack­do­wn aga­inst his own citizens.

5th October

After the inter­ven­ti­on the situ­a­ti­on in Ser­bia was unpre­ce­den­ted, oppo­si­ti­o­nal poli­ti­cal par­ti­es were frigh­te­ned and frac­ti­o­ned. Milo­se­vic tri­ed to com­pen­sa­te Koso­vo fai­lu­re by ter­ro­ri­zing own citi­zens. Demo­cra­tic Par­ty (Zoran Djin­djic) and youth move­ment “Otpor” (“Resi­stan­ce”) star­ted gat­he­ring and demon­stra­ting. Milo­se­vic respon­ded with for­ce and poli­ce arrests of a gre­at num­ber of “Otpor” and oppo­si­ti­on members.

Milo­se­vic anno­un­ced ear­ly elec­ti­ons on Sep­tem­ber 24 (2000). He and his poli­ti­cal par­ty SPS (Ser­bi­an Soci­a­list Par­ty) were con­vin­ced in undi­vi­ded sup­port of public opi­ni­on. But they were wrong. Zoran Djin­djic mana­ged to uni­fy Ser­bi­an oppo­si­ti­on and form Demo­cra­tic oppo­si­ti­on of Serbia’s (DOS –con­si­sted of 19 poli­ti­cal par­ti­es) with its pre­si­den­ti­al can­di­da­te Voji­slav Kostu­ni­ca (lea­der of Demo­cra­tic Par­ty of Ser­bia – DSS). In spi­te of media pro­pa­gan­da and vari­o­us kinds of inti­mi­da­ti­ons and ter­ror Voji­slav Kostu­ni­ca and DOS won elec­ti­ons. Despi­te obvi­o­us elec­ti­on fai­lu­re Milo­se­vic refu­sed to accept elec­ti­on results. This pro­vo­ked huge uphe­a­val and mas­si­ve ral­ly in Octo­ber 5th 2000 that even­tu­al­ly overt­hrew Milo­se­vic regime.

Events of 5th Octo­ber were orga­ni­zed main­ly by Zoran Djin­djic and his Demo­cra­tic Par­ty (which he was lea­der of). On that eve Djin­djic mana­ged to get assu­ran­ce that army and sta­te poli­ce would not use for­ce on demon­stra­tors. He also con­tac­ted JSO com­man­der (JSO – Unit for Spe­ci­al Ope­ra­ti­on, for­mer para­mi­li­ta­ry orga­ni­za­ti­on at that time a part of Ser­bi­an sta­te poli­ce) Milo­rad Ule­mek to be assu­red that this mili­ta­ry unit would not enga­ge in demon­stra­ti­on breakup.

Demon­stra­ti­ons were suc­cess­ful (over 800 000 peo­ple were invol­ved). On 6th Octo­ber, with medi­a­ti­on of Russia’s fore­ign mini­ster Igor Iva­nov , Milo­se­vic recog­ni­zed the  elec­ti­on results.

Refor­mer and Conservator

Voji­slav Kostu­ni­ca beca­me pre­si­dent of FRY and on Sep­tem­ber repu­blic elec­ti­on DOS won aga­in and Zoran Djin­djic beca­me Ser­bi­an pri­me mini­ster. Ener­ge­tic lea­der as he was, Zoran Djin­djic star­ted wor­king hard on coun­try reformation.

His govern­ment had many bur­ning eco­no­mi­cal issu­es to tac­kle with. Nevert­he­less, gre­at poli­ti­cal obstac­les remained:

- Kostu­ni­ca insi­sted on con­ti­nu­i­ty of for­mer regi­me, Kostu­ni­ca inhe­ri­ted and embra­ce the old fede­ral struc­tu­re (hard core com­mu­nist struc­tu­re that incor­po­ra­ted fede­ral army and intel­li­gen­ce). He advo­ca­ted poli­cy of “con­ti­nu­a­ti­on but not retaliation”.

- Sud­den Djukanovic’s insi­sten­ce on inde­pen­den­ce of Mon­te­ne­gro from com­mon sta­te and Dju­ka­no­vic unwil­ling­ness to coo­pe­ra­te with Djindjic.

- Alt­ho­ugh Djin­djic was pri­me mini­ster he inhe­ri­ted Milosevic’s sta­te poli­ce and intel­li­gen­ce. In fact he has no real power, and had not have sup­port from other branc­hes of government.

Ser­bia ente­red the sta­te of diarc­hy. Ener­ge­tic reforms on repu­blic level were con­stan­tly been endan­ge­red by stats quo poli­tics of Voj­si­lav Kostu­ni­ca on the fede­ral level. Wit­ho­ut Kostunica’s appro­val Djin­djic orga­ni­zed arrest of Milo­se­vic and his depar­tu­re to The Hague. This bro­ught up the final split in DOS, and Kostunica’s DSS left the coa­li­ti­on, con­se­qu­en­tly beco­ming oppo­si­ti­on  (on repu­blic level).

Vast majo­ri­ty of media were bac­king Kostu­ni­ca (even sta­te run tele­vi­si­on sta­ti­on RTS that was sup­po­se­dly under Djinj­dics juris­dic­ti­on). Well kno­wn from the expe­ri­en­ce of tran­si­ti­o­nal coun­tri­es in Eastern Euro­pe, any sig­ni­fi­cant reforms usu­al­ly lack public sup­port. Kostu­ni­ca used poli­ti­cal and soci­al dema­go­gy of nati­o­na­lism to gain public support.

Under the Djin­djic govern­ment Ser­bia mana­ged to accom­plish noti­ce­a­ble reforms, but the side effects of dra­stic reforms pro­du­ced public discon­tent and bitterness.

On the other side, Dju­ka­no­vic poli­tics was para­do­xi­cal at first glan­ce. He rhe­to­ri­cal­ly sup­por­ted Ser­bi­an refor­mers but in fact he gave indi­rect sup­port to Kostu­ni­ca by not enga­ging in fede­ral issu­es with Ser­bi­an refor­mers and sta­ying asi­de. In fact this situ­a­ti­on sui­ted him well in order to gain poli­ti­cal sup­port in Mon­te­ne­gro on an acco­unt that “not­hing has chan­ged in Ser­bia” and that the main poli­ti­cal goal sho­uld be inde­pen­den­ce. What inde­ed hap­pe­ned is that Dju­ka­no­vic, as one of the Milosevic’s disci­ple used Milosevic’s gene­ral pat­tern of ruling by intro­duc­ti­on the gre­at poli­ti­cal sto­ry of nati­on buil­ding and nati­o­nal self-defen­se, in spi­te of huge eco­no­mi­cal pro­blems in his own country.

Eco­no­mic Poli­cy During Djindjic's Government

Zoran Djin­djic has star­ted far reac­hing reform pro­gram­me imme­di­a­te­ly after taking offi­ce in Janu­a­ry 2001. Among his pri­o­ri­ti­es were refor­ming public finan­ce, pri­va­ti­za­ti­on or liqu­i­da­ti­on of sta­te enter­pri­ses and banks and inte­gra­ti­on of eco­no­my into the inter­na­ti­o­nal order. After some suc­cess at the begin­ning, with adop­ti­on of very free mar­ket laws such as Pri­va­ti­za­ti­on and Labor Laws, liqu­i­da­ti­on of four major sta­te owned banks and intro­du­cing basic trans­pa­ren­cy into the public finan­ce, Djindjic's appro­ach to eco­no­my quic­kly tur­ned out to be hal­fway and una­ble to make cle­ar cut off from Milo­se­vic system. Poli­ti­cal and under­gro­und inter­est gro­ups, immen­se­ly bene­fi­ted from Milosevic's diri­gi­sme eco­no­mic poli­cy and favo­ri­tism in 1990s, that were diso­ri­en­ted after the Octo­ber 5th, quic­kly reco­ve­red from the first shock and orga­ni­zed its lob­by gro­ups again.

That lob­bi­es, recap­tu­red the sta­te and from 2002 star­ted aga­in to influ­en­ce sta­te eco­no­mic poli­cy. After the ini­ti­al libe­ra­li­za­ti­on of fore­ign tra­de thro­ugh abo­lis­hing most of the discre­ti­o­na­ry power of the sta­te and redu­cing taxes, furt­her libe­ra­li­za­ti­on was suc­cess­ful­ly resisted.

Restric­ti­ons of entry for fore­ign banks were intro­du­ced in order to pro­tect dome­stic mana­ge­ment from ban­krupt­cy. Eve­ry fore­ign bank ente­ring Ser­bi­an mar­ket sho­uld buy one dome­stic bank pre­vi­o­u­sly. Public con­sump­ti­on as a per­cen­ta­ge of GDP even incre­a­sed com­pa­red to Milosevic's time.

Record on tax cuts was mixed: some of them were cut, some even incre­a­sed. The­re was a lit­tle mea­su­re to decen­tra­li­ze eco­no­mic power. Cen­tral govern­ment in Bel­gra­de still has most of the fiscal and regu­la­to­ry means for han­dling eco­no­my in its hands

On the other hand, IMF and WB pra­i­sed Djindjic's reforms from the­ir incep­ti­on but later on beca­me more skeptical.

Coup d’etat  and Assassination

In 2003 the poli­ti­cal cli­ma­te in Ser­bia was in no favor of Ser­bi­an refor­mers. Zoran Djinj­dic and his govern­ment were on con­stant media lynch. It was not just beca­u­se of eco­no­mi­cal mea­su­res that the govern­ment imple­men­ted. But also beca­u­se his com­mit­ment to under­mi­ne Milosevic’s poli­ti­cal legacy.

In order to do so he had to disman­tle — first of all — Ser­bi­an intel­li­gen­ce (DB) and reform the poli­ce. In doing this he embra­ced huge pro­blems, beca­u­se it was hard to find sui­ta­ble men for the job, vast majo­ri­ty of ser­vi­ce pro­fes­si­o­nals were invol­ved in vari­o­us kinds of ille­gal acti­vi­ti­es during 90’.

He remo­ved the lea­der of the ser­vi­ce which promp­ted  the swift respon­se of JSO. Milo­rad Ule­mek orga­ni­zed insur­rec­ti­on of JSO. The unit bloc­ked the main Belgrade’s brid­ge in full arm for­ce. It was first coup d’etat. Kostu­ni­ca and his DSS gave sup­port to this event. He sad that “eve­rybo­dy has right to pro­test, physi­ci­ans in whi­te uni­forms, sol­ders with guns and tanks…” The sta­te was power­less, Djin­djic had to make com­pro­mi­se and to chan­ge the lea­ding men of BIA, he resi­sted chan­ging the mini­ster of poli­ce (which was also demanded).

In spi­te of all this, Djindjic’s govern­ment con­ti­nu­ed to imple­ment eco­no­mi­cal reforms, and Djinj­dic star­ted reor­ga­ni­zing the poli­ce (by for­ming “Zan­dar­me­ria” paral­lel to JSO) with idea to under­mi­ne ille­gal sta­te ser­vi­ces. But this was in fact  “the cat and mou­se” game. The pre­pa­ra­ti­on for huge clash with orga­ni­zed-sta­te cri­mi­nal was on its way when assas­si­na­ti­on hap­pe­ned. Ule­mek, JSO and well-kno­wn Ser­bi­an under­gro­und (“Zemun­ski klan”) orga­ni­zed the assassination.

It beca­me cer­ta­in that Kostu­ni­ca and his poli­tics gave unop­po­sed sup­port, and the­re are many indi­ca­ti­ons that he was not jus indi­rec­tly invol­ved (his main col­la­bo­ra­tors and assign­ment instruc­tors  were Aco Tomic – chi­ef o fede­ral intel­li­gen­ce, man in per­ma­nent con­tact with Ule­mek and Rade Bula­to­vic pre­sen­tly chef of BIA who was in con­tact with the gro­up “Zemun­ski klan”).

Poli­ti­cal aspects of assas­si­na­ti­on were cle­ar. The acti­on was cal­led “Stop to the Hag”. It was reac­ti­on to Djindjic’s poli­tics of reforms.

But ener­ge­tic respon­se of repu­blic poli­ce came off with poli­ce acti­on “Sabre”. Assas­si­na­tors were arre­sted and Ule­mek ran away. Poli­ce hour was intro­du­ced, and for almost three months sta­te of emer­gen­cy took effect only even­tu­al­ly ending when govern­ment of Zoran Ziv­ko­vic anno­un­ced elec­ti­on in 2003.

Pre­sent Situation

After the elec­ti­ons Kostu­ni­ca beca­me pri­me mini­ster of Ser­bia. He held mino­ri­ty govern­ment with sup­port of Milosevic’s unre­for­med SPS. Djindjic’s demo­cra­tic par­ty lost the elec­ti­ons. Mea­nwhi­le, Mon­te­ne­gro held refe­ren­dum and beca­me inde­pen­dent sta­te in 2006.

The tri­al to Djindjic’s mur­de­rers has not jet finis­hed, due to con­stant obstruc­ti­ons not only from under­gro­und but also from the side of offi­ci­al poli­cy.  Milo­se­vic poli­ti­cal lega­cy is still strong in Ser­bia and radi­cals (Ser­bi­an Radi­cal Par­ty (SRS)– the stron­gest poli­ti­cal par­ty in Ser­bia) and par­tly Kostu­ni­ca are its continuators.

Kostu­ni­ca put back in ser­vi­ce all the peo­ple who were disc­har­ged of duti­es during and befo­re “Sabre”. He stop­ped and rol­led back Djinj­dic hard gai­ned reforms of intel­li­gen­ce and poli­ce by dismis­sing lar­ge num­ber of hig­hly skil­led pro­fes­si­o­nals. He even dismis­sed the most suc­cess­ful poli­ce offi­cers who led the famo­us poli­ce acti­on “Sabre” and who were respon­si­ble for arre­sting Djindjic’s murderers.

As Kostu­ni­ca took the power, he imme­di­a­te­ly stops the reforms of the pre­vi­o­us govern­ment. He com­ple­te­ly stal­led the pri­va­ti­za­ti­on (for almost one year not a sin­gle sta­te owned enter­pri­se was sold), radi­cal­ly incre­a­sed the govern­ment spen­ding and wor­sen eco­no­mic situ­a­ti­on in the coun­try. As Djindjic’s govern­ment suc­ce­e­ded in cut­ting of the infla­ti­on from 40% to 7,1% from 2000 to 2003, Kostunica’s govern­ment mana­ged to dou­ble infla­ti­on and to incre­a­se administration.

In 2006 Kostunica’s govern­ment fall down, but he is still pri­me mini­ster, and his coa­li­ti­on rules beca­u­se the new govern­ment is not yet formed.

It is hard situ­a­ti­on for demo­cra­cy ori­en­ted poli­ti­cal for­ces in Ser­bia. The strong advo­ca­tes of demo­cra­cy in Ser­bia are Demo­cra­tic Par­ty (Boris Tadic, pre­si­dent of Ser­bia), and Libe­ral-Demo­cra­tic Par­ty (led by Cedo­mir Jova­no­vic — Djindjic’s main asso­ci­a­te and the gro­up of hard core Djindjic’s asso­ci­a­tes and fol­lo­wers), and few non-par­li­a­men­ta­ry poli­ti­cal orga­ni­za­ti­ons. The clo­a­ked demo­crats are Kostunica’s DSS and G17+ rea­di­ly coo­pe­ra­ti­ve with old regi­me par­ti­es.  Very influ­en­ti­al par­ti­es of old regi­me that ente­red par­li­a­ment are SPS and SRS. Alt­ho­ugh DS gai­ned the lar­gest num­ber of pro-demo­cra­tic votes on the last elec­ti­on (in ove­rall SRS got the lar­gest num­ber) it can­not form govern­ment by itself. It has to work with Kostu­ni­ca and others in order to do that.

The situ­a­ti­on is not much bet­ter in Mon­te­ne­gro. Eco­no­my of Mon­te­ne­gro sur­vi­ved sanc­ti­ons and war during 1990s in the simi­lar way like Ser­bi­an. It was based on govern­ment-spon­so­red smug­gling, orga­ni­zed by intel­li­gen­ce ser­vi­ce. Seni­or offi­cers of Mon­te­ne­grin UDBA beca­me ric­hest man in the coun­try as well as the­ir Ser­bi­an coun­ter­parts. Flow of com­mo­di­ti­es was exc­lu­si­ve­ly con­trol­led by poli­ce, and regi­me of public con­trols of export and import busi­ness pro­vi­ded pri­vi­le­ged nomenc­la­tu­re with extre­me rent-see­king profits.

A new finan­ci­al-poli­ti­cal eli­te has ari­sen. Just like in any other tran­si­ti­on coun­try, but by far more per­va­si­ve, nomenc­la­tu­re of ex com­mu­nist par­ty and its poli­ti­cal poli­ce beca­me owner of most of the indu­stry and exc­lu­si­ve con­trol­ler of lar­ge por­ti­on of country's business.

 Alek­san­dar Nova­ko­vic & Ivan Jan­ko­vic