Who Needs Monetary Policy Anyway?

The first cen­tral banks were foun­ded by the end of the 17th cen­tu­ry in Swe­den (Swe­dish Riks­bank) and England (Bank of England). The inter­fe­ren­ce of the sta­te in mone­ta­ry affa­irs has a still lon­ger histo­ry. The main rea­son for the deve­lop­ment of cen­tral banks was pro­vi­ding reve­nu­es for the sta­te, sin­ce the levying of taxes was both inef­fi­ci­ent and unpo­pu­lar. Usu­al­ly, the mono­po­ly for coi­ning money was given by the sta­te to a pri­va­te bank, and the sta­te would take most of the pro­fits. In time the role of the cen­tral bank chan­ged and it’s field of work expan­ded enor­mo­u­sly. Firs­tly, the gold secu­ri­ty of 100% was aban­do­ned, which did not enti­re­ly exist in an enti­re­ly free ban­king system, but in that system, the banks were limi­ted in that fra­u­du­lent field of work, sin­ce the emis­si­on of too many papers wit­ho­ut secu­ri­ty could lead any bank to ruin. The Cen­tral Bank could easi­ly sol­ve that pro­blem, sin­ce it was prop­ped up by the sta­te. Then the func­ti­on of the “len­der of the last resort” was esta­blis­hed, which furt­her sti­mu­la­ted banks to expand the­ir cre­dit, len­ding money that is not the pro­per­ty of the bank. The state’s inter­fe­ren­ce in mone­ta­ry poli­cy reac­hes it’s zenith in the 20th cen­tu­ry with the aban­don­ment of the clas­sic Gold Stan­dard, with the intro­duc­ti­on of the com­pul­si­ve reser­ves, and other “mone­ta­ry instru­ments.“ Ter­ri­ble shocks erup­ted as a result of govern­ment plan­ning. The Gre­at Depres­si­on, and the hype­rin­fla­ti­on in Ger­ma­ny or Ser­bia are just the most obvi­o­us exam­ples, fre­qu­ent cri­ses and shocks beca­me com­mon­pla­ce, as well as ende­mic infla­ti­on from the 60ties.

Today, the sta­te inter­fe­ren­ce in mone­ta­ry affa­irs is dog­ma, and even the eco­no­mists that pro­pa­ga­te free mar­ket in all other cases, in the case of money beco­me sta­tists. Defen­ders of fre­e­dom like Mil­ton Fri­ed­man and other mone­ta­rists enti­re­ly disre­gard free mar­ket of money and advi­se sta­te mono­po­ly on money and infla­ti­o­na­ry policy.

When faced with the accu­sa­ti­on that govern­ment inter­fe­ren­ce cau­ses mar­ket cri­ses, keyn­si­ans and soci­a­lists of dif­fe­rent colors respond that the cri­ses are the pro­duct of mar­ket imper­fec­ti­ons and that the sta­te is the gua­ran­tee of sta­bi­li­ty and gro­wth. They will indig­nan­tly discard any noti­on of free cho­i­ce when money is con­cer­ned. The Gold Stan­dard is an ridi­cu­lo­us and obso­le­te idea, and qui­te impos­si­ble in the con­di­ti­ons of a “modern eco­no­my.” Accor­ding to them, the sta­te (the Cen­tral Bank in par­ti­cu­lar) sho­uld sup­ply the eco­no­my with “the nee­ded amo­unt of money,” sho­uld main­ta­in “sta­ble pri­ces,” low inter­est rates or use pri­ma­ry emis­si­on (and eup­he­mism for prin­ting money) as a “gro­wth sti­mu­la­ti­on” by incre­a­sing aggre­ga­te demand. Is the gold stan­dard real­ly impos­si­ble, or are the argu­ments for cen­tral plan­ning and mono­po­ly just sop­hisms? Do free peo­ple real­ly need “mone­ta­ry poli­cy” and can the eco­no­my func­ti­on wit­ho­ut “eno­ugh cur­ren­cy,” the mea­su­re of which is deci­ded by a bure­a­u­crat that calls him­self The Ban­ker of All Bankers?

The answer is obvi­o­us; a mar­ket eco­no­my can func­ti­on wit­ho­ut the “cre­a­ti­ve mone­ta­ry poli­cy,” and do it qui­te well. If it were not so, how can one expla­in the results of coun­tri­es like Esto­nia, Lit­hu­a­nia or Bul­ga­ria, coun­tri­es that had given up on “mone­ta­ry poli­cy” and cen­tral ban­king and intro­du­ced the Cur­ren­cy Board or the exam­ple of coun­tri­es whe­re mone­ta­ry com­pe­ti­ti­on is allo­wed, or whe­re only one fore­ign cur­ren­cy is used. The advo­ca­tes of sta­tism do not care to expla­in tho­se occur­ren­ces and are per­si­sten­tly avo­i­ding any kind of mea­ning­ful discus­si­on. They call the Cur­ren­cy Board and “sle­e­ve­less shirt” and are wea­ving tales abo­ut nati­o­nal sove­re­ign­ty, which is by the way, respon­si­ble for the most hor­ri­fying wars in histo­ry, and who­se cau­ses can be tra­ced to statism.

Sta­tist plan­ners are aga­inst the Cur­ren­cy Board for an obvi­o­us rea­son, beca­u­se of the simi­la­ri­ty that exists betwe­en a vari­ant of the Cur­ren­cy Board and the Gold Stan­dard. If it beco­mes obvi­o­us that the Cur­ren­cy Board works, that means that the Gold Stan­dard is qui­te pos­si­ble, and not just that, but that it is far more supe­ri­or than the paper money that is wit­ho­ut gold cove­ra­ge, who­se value is “guar­ded” and gua­ran­te­ed by the Sta­te. The Cur­ren­cy Board has a long histo­ry, as first of the­se appe­a­red in English colo­ni­es in the 19th cen­tu­ry. The colo­ni­al cur­ren­cy was fixed to the pound, and the reser­ves were in pounds, gold or sil­ver. All the chan­ges in mone­ta­ry mass depen­ded on tra­de and capi­tal flo­ws. Sin­ce the colo­ni­es tra­ded mos­tly with the home coun­try (England), the tra­de defi­cit was cove­red in capi­tal influx, so a sig­ni­fi­cant chan­ge in pri­ces due to cur­ren­cy fluc­tu­a­ti­on was a rare occur­ren­ce. The Cur­ren­cy Board had it’s rena­is­san­ce during the end of the 20th cen­tu­ry, when it was adop­ted by some coun­tri­es in South Ame­ri­ca, and Esto­nia, Lit­hu­a­nia, Bul­ga­ria and Bosnia.

In a Cur­ren­cy Board system, the local cur­ren­cy has 100–120% cove­ra­ge in a reli­a­ble fore­ign cur­ren­cy. The cur­ren­cy reser­ves are usu­al­ly divi­ded thre­e­fold. Firs­tly, cash reser­ves, that can be used to respond to the ave­ra­ge demand, secon­dly, hig­hly liqu­id reser­ves that can be easi­ly con­ver­ted into money to answer the incre­a­sed demand for fore­ign cur­ren­cy. Thir­dly, a part is inve­sted into assets that need not be hig­hly liqu­id, as the expe­ri­en­ce has sho­wn it is not nee­ded. The total cove­ra­ge is a gua­ran­tee for the trust of the local cur­ren­cy, and nega­tes the pos­si­bi­li­ty of spe­cu­la­ti­ve attack, which are the weak­nes­ses of the fixed exc­han­ge cour­se with a Cen­tral Bank. The mone­ta­ry mass in a Cur­ren­cy Board regi­me is free flo­wing; depen­ding from the cur­rent and capi­tal part of balan­ce of payment. The sup­ply of the cur­ren­cy is mos­tly depen­dent on import/export, fore­ign invest­ment and pri­va­te trans­ac­ti­ons. The Cur­ren­cy Board does not have the “cre­di­tor of last resort” func­ti­on, and busi­ness banks do not have man­da­to­ry and liqu­i­di­ty reser­ves, which cre­a­tes a hig­her disci­pli­ne of the ban­king sec­tor. Banks could not lend demand depo­sits, but have to keep sig­ni­fi­cant part of it in the­ir reser­ves to save the­ir liquidity.

If the finan­ci­al sec­tor is hig­hly deve­lo­ped, the banks can take chan­ces and, in the case the­ir liqu­i­di­ty is impe­ri­led, use the inner-ban­king money mar­ket, but they will have to pay inter­est, so the banks are for­ced to hold sub­stan­ti­al reser­ves, which les­sens the pos­si­bi­li­ty of infla­ti­on. The cho­i­ce of the reser­ve cur­ren­cy has the effect of chan­ne­ling exports toward its coun­try of ori­gin, also. The simi­la­ri­ty betwe­en the Cur­ren­cy Board and the Gold Stan­dard is in the 100% stan­dard, as well as in the non-exi­sten­ce of a “cre­a­ti­ve mone­ta­ry poli­cy,” as all incre­a­se in money sup­ply is auto­no­mo­us and free any sta­te inter­fe­ren­ce. The adjust­ment is auto­ma­tic, alt­ho­ugh the expe­ri­en­ce has sho­wn that lar­ge mone­ta­ry fluc­tu­a­ti­ons did not hap­pen, as the pos­si­ble defi­cit of cur­rent acco­unt is cove­red by sur­plus of the capi­tal balan­ce . The dif­fe­ren­ce with the Gold Stan­dard is that, with the adop­ti­on of a fore­ign cur­ren­cy, it’s infla­ti­on is taken over, as well as the inter­est rates, and that is an minus com­pa­red to the Gold Stan­dard, but sin­ce usu­al­ly the sta­tes with high infla­ti­on take over the cur­ren­ci­es of the sta­tes’ with low infla­ti­on (in the case of tho­se four Euro­pe­an coun­tri­es, it was Ger­ma­ny) that is not a huge pro­blem. The dif­fe­ren­ce is also in that, that in the Cur­ren­cy Board a reser­ve of 100% exists for the money that is emit­ted by the Board, but the money that is emit­ted by the banks does not have that stan­dard, name­ly, banks use part of the­ir demand depo­sits to lend money. Howe­ver, the most impor­tant objec­ti­on which could be rai­sed aga­inst that con­cerns of exi­sten­ce of mono­po­ly in issu­ing of money. Tho­ugh govern­ment plan­ning is sig­ni­fi­can­tly decre­a­sed and discre­ti­o­na­ry poli­cy abo­lis­hed, still rema­ins the pro­blem of mono­po­ly of cur­ren­cy board.

The the­o­re­tic value that the Cur­ren­cy Board has stems form it’s simi­la­ri­ty with the Gold Stan­dard. If an eco­no­my can func­ti­on smo­ot­hly in a Cur­ren­cy Board envi­ron­ment, then the Gold Stan­dard is not just obvi­o­u­sly pos­si­ble, but is the only system for a free peo­ple. If the sta­te abo­lis­hes the mono­po­ly on cur­ren­cy emis­si­on, and allo­ws fre­e­dom, what would hap­pen? Firs­tly, the­re would be an uncon­trol­led emis­si­on of money by the banks and the infla­ti­on will skyroc­ket, but the peo­ple would rapi­dly find an answer. The gre­a­test advo­ca­te of the Gold Stan­dard in the 20th cen­tu­ry, Mur­ray N. Roth­bard, wro­te: “The result of fre­e­dom in the mone­ta­ry area was and will alwa­ys be the same, the Gold Stan­dard.” In the Gold Stan­dard system, the only duty of the sta­te would be to punish fra­ud, like fal­si­fying money and using others’ money wit­ho­ut per­mis­si­on of cre­dits that bank emits on the basis of demand depo­sits. All the rest is the func­ti­on of the mar­ket and the banks would emit money based on the­ir gold reser­ves, and appro­ve cre­dits based on savings. The role of the cre­di­tor would be taken over by insu­ran­ce com­pa­ni­es, pri­va­te pen­si­on funds, invest­ment banks and funds and other finan­ci­al organizations.

If all of this is so sim­ple and if the Gold Stan­dard is so pos­si­ble and attrac­ti­ve, why do we then have mono­po­li­es like cen­tral ban­king (its’ fun­ny that the Sta­te masqu­e­ra­des as a trust-buster, whi­le here we can see who is real­ly respon­si­ble for the cre­a­ti­on of mono­po­li­es) and govern­ment plan­ning which an eup­he­mism “mone­ta­ry poli­cy” was cre­a­ted. Who needs “mone­ta­ry poli­cy anyway?”

The answer is sim­ple here, also. Mone­ta­ry poli­cy is an instru­ment for aggran­di­ze­ment of the State’s power. The Sta­te finan­ces defi­cits and prints money whe­ne­ver it needs to do so. Tro­ugh the mono­po­li­stic orga­ni­za­ti­on, which calls itself the Cen­tral Bank, the sta­te con­trols pri­va­te banks, pro­hi­bits or allo­ws mer­gers and take­o­vers and the­ir busi­ness expan­si­on. As the first bene­fi­ci­a­ry of the “pri­ma­ry emis­si­on,” the sta­te robs its citi­zens tro­ugh an invi­si­ble tax. But the sta­te is not the only one who needs mone­ta­ry poli­cy, for behind this system are the ide­as which led to govern­ment mono­po­li­es and sta­tism. Tho­se ide­as come from “experts” in “mone­ta­ry poli­cy,” which, accor­ding to them, is best led from one pla­ce and the head of one man, or a small gro­up of men. That is what tho­se “experts” tell us, and behind tho­se words lies an hosti­li­ty towards capi­ta­lism and free mar­ket and the total disre­spect toward the­ir fel­low man. They are just rent-see­kers, and do not care for the “com­mon good” but for this: what would they do in a system that does not need the­ir advi­ce? They would lose the­ir pri­vi­le­ges in such a system. Who would regu­la­te the inter­est rate, man­da­to­ry reser­ves or the expan­si­on of money sup­ply, and lead an effi­ci­ent mone­ta­ry poli­cy? The answer is cle­ar – a free market.

Milan Petro­vic


Bibli­o­grap­hy: 

  • Mur­ray N. Roth­bard, Šta je drža­va ura­di­la našem nov­cu, Glo­bal Book, Novi Sad, 1998.
  • Mur­ray N. Roth­bard, Man, Eco­no­my, and Sta­te, Ludwig von Mises Institute
  • Kurt A. Schu­ler, Cur­ren­cy Boards, Dis­ser­ta­ti­on, Geor­ge Mason Uni­ver­si­ty, Fair­fax, Virginia,1992.