Europeans, not Americans, Should Try to Solve Kosovo Issue!


Sur­pri­sin­gly, a lot of poli­ti­ci­ans and experts took time to public­ly discuss the Koso­vo issue. Non­go­vern­men­tal orga­ni­za­ti­ons have been orga­ni­zing round tables and events one after anot­her. Did they do this beca­u­se some­o­ne wan­ted to talk abo­ut Koso­vo from first hand expe­ri­en­ce, or beca­u­se that per­son wan­ted to swing the public deba­te on the­ir side? I beli­e­ve eve­ryo­ne has a right to an opi­ni­on, but public­ly spe­a­king abo­ut it is anot­her thing. At the­se DC events, I have too many times enco­un­te­red the spe­a­kers who wouldn’t be fami­li­ar with the Koso­vo issue or the histo­ry of the Bal­kans. The­se self-proc­la­i­med experts would still cou­ra­ge­o­u­sly read the­ir pre­pa­red sta­te­ments and pre­tend they are the ones we need to con­sult to have a full pic­tu­re of the issue. The pro­blem is that when some­o­ne spe­aks public­ly the assump­ti­on is that this per­son kno­ws more abo­ut an issue than most of the peo­ple in the cro­wd. Sadly, self-proc­la­i­med experts are only misle­a­ding and misin­for­ming tho­se that blin­dly gran­ted them cre­di­bi­li­ty. David Came­ron, the lea­der of the oppo­si­ti­on in the Uni­ted King­dom, was one of them.

Opi­ni­ons on when the ten­si­ons betwe­en eth­nic Serbs and Alba­ni­ans from Koso­vo star­ted vary. Thus, the­re is no dispu­te that in the last deca­de both sides under­to­ok inhu­ma­ne and inter­na­ti­o­nal­ly unac­cep­ta­ble atrocities.

In 1999, US fore­ign poli­cy inter­ve­ned in the dispu­te. For­mer Secre­ta­ry of Sta­te Made­le­i­ne Albright and Pre­si­dent Wil­li­am J. Clin­ton were more inter­e­sted in bom­bing Ser­bia than enco­u­ra­ging a pea­ce­ful set­tle­ment in Koso­vo. NATO acted under US instruc­ti­ons. Bombs were rai­ning on Ser­bia for 78 days stra­ight. Was­hing­ton beli­e­ved that mate­ri­al dama­ge and inno­cent civi­li­an lives were a col­la­te­ral dama­ge to the vic­to­ry on the Balkans.

Befo­re the bom­bing, Koso­vo did not pre­sent a huma­ni­ta­ri­an cri­sis. The­re­fo­re, NATO had no rea­son or argu­ment to get invol­ved. Yet it still did, with gra­ve con­se­qu­en­ces. NATO’s bom­bing led to the eth­nic cle­an­sing of Alba­ni­ans in Koso­vo, which was orc­he­stra­ted by the Milo­še­vić regi­me. It is esti­ma­ted that aro­und 7.500 to 10.000 eth­nic Alba­ni­ans were kil­led. More­o­ver, the refu­gee cri­sis was trig­ge­red and insta­bi­li­ty in the regi­on exa­cer­ba­ted. Lives have been sacri­fi­ced, rat­her than saved.

Whi­le Ame­ri­cans were cele­bra­ting at home, aro­und 250.000 peo­ple fled Koso­vo in fear of Alba­ni­ans and con­flicts that erup­ted. Among tho­se who ran for the­ir lives were eth­nic Serbs, Cro­ats, Gyp­si­es, Jews, and non-Alba­ni­an Muslims. Tho­se who were not fast eno­ugh were impri­so­ned, bea­ten, kid­nap­ped, rob­bed or shot. Even histo­ric monu­ments, ort­ho­dox churc­hes, mona­ste­ri­es, and other reli­gi­o­us sites have been inten­ti­o­nal­ly plun­de­red and destro­yed. The lea­ders of the Alba­ni­ans in Koso­vo deno­un­ced the­se acti­ons but have also not done anyt­hing to stop them from hap­pe­ning. Ame­ri­cans didn’t only stop the Ser­bi­an mili­ta­ry offen­si­ve over the eth­nic Alba­ni­ans in Koso­vo, they also con­tro­ver­si­al­ly step­ped in on the side of the Koso­vo Libe­ra­ti­on Army (KLA).

Back in the Uni­ted Sta­tes, the rule of law was under­mi­ned when Pre­si­dent Clin­ton waged war aga­inst the Fede­ral Repu­blic of Yugo­sla­via wit­ho­ut the sanc­ti­on of a con­gres­si­o­nal dec­la­ra­ti­on of war. During the 2000 pre­si­den­ti­al cam­pa­ign, Con­do­le­ez­za Rice argu­ed that the Uni­ted Sta­tes sho­uld shun sen­ding its pea­ce­ke­e­ping and nati­on-buil­ding mis­si­ons to the Bal­kans. Geor­ge W. Bush, a pre­si­den­ti­al can­di­da­te at the time, beli­e­ved that the Uni­ted Sta­tes sho­uld with­draw its tro­ops from the Bal­kans. Even tho­ugh both poli­ti­ci­ans chan­ged the­ir mind after only a year in power, they were right in the first pla­ce to oppo­se an Ame­ri­can pre­sen­ce in the Bal­kans, as this local con­flict did not pre­sent a thre­at to the Uni­ted Sta­tes, which is a con­sti­tu­ti­o­nal requ­i­re­ment for the deplo­yment of the US troops.

Clinton’s fore­ign poli­cy, obli­vi­o­us as it was abo­ut the poli­ti­cal and histo­ri­cal con­te­xt of events in Koso­vo, did more harm than good in the regi­on. On too many occa­si­ons fore­ign inter­ven­ti­on has taught us that such acti­ons are unsuc­cess­ful and lea­ve behind an even gre­a­ter mess and the pro­cre­a­ti­on of new dispu­tes and ten­si­ons. It is never too late for the Uni­tes Sta­tes to rea­li­ze that the­ir tro­ops have no pla­ce in Koso­vo. With­dra­wal of all US tro­ops from Koso­vo and con­ve­ying respon­si­bi­li­ty to the Euro­pe­ans is the only right step, which sho­uld have hap­pe­ned in the first pla­ce a long time ago.

Hen­ce, the­re are two expla­na­ti­ons as to why this has not yet hap­pe­ned: the Sta­te Depart­ment i) does not trust the Euro­pe­an Uni­on to be able to sol­ve this issue or ii) has stra­te­gic rea­sons in the bro­a­der regi­on of Alba­nia, Bosnia and Her­ze­go­vi­na, Koso­vo, Bul­ga­ria, Roma­nia, etc. No mat­ter what the Sta­te Depart­ment cla­ims, the Pen­ta­gon is con­vin­ced that Ame­ri­can sol­di­ers have no rea­son to be sta­ti­o­ned in Kosovo.

Also, the West needs to sha­ke off the mista­ken beli­ef that fede­ral nati­ons with a pro­tec­ti­on for mino­ri­ty rights can be cre­a­ted arti­fi­ci­al­ly and with for­ce. Tho­se that beli­e­ve that secu­ri­ty and equ­al tre­at­ment can be gua­ran­te­ed for the Ser­bi­an mino­ri­ty in Koso­vo are living an illusion.

It seems logi­cal that if a majo­ri­ty in Koso­vo has a right to sece­de from Ser­bia, the Ser­bi­an mino­ri­ty will have the same
right to sece­de after Koso­vo beco­mes inde­pen­dent. Anot­her exam­ple could be Repu­bli­ka Srb­ska, that is just abo­ut 100 kilo­me­ters away and whe­re citi­zens a cou­ple of times alre­a­dy cal­led the­ir repre­sen­ta­ti­ves to faci­li­ta­te a pea­ce­ful inde­pen­den­ce from Bosnia and Her­ze­go­vi­na. The­se calls are not that big of a sur­pri­se, as no one wants to live in a coun­try whe­re inter­na­ti­o­nal pea­ce tro­ops are inde­fi­ni­te­ly nee­ded to avo­id futu­re con­flict. At the same time, can the­se tro­ops gua­ran­tee that new clas­hes will not ari­se? I am not an opti­mist in that regard.

The­re is lit­tle doubt that the cur­rent situ­a­ti­on in Koso­vo is not bene­fi­ting anyo­ne, and that it is unsu­sta­i­na­ble. The
Ser­bi­an side is war­ning that one-sided deci­si­ons are dan­ge­ro­us. If Koso­vo dec­la­res inde­pen­den­ce the Ser­bi­an govern­ment is plan­ning to cut all diplo­ma­tic rela­ti­ons with the coun­tri­es that will vio­la­te ter­ri­to­ri­al una­ni­mi­ty and sove­re­ign­ty of the­ir coun­try. The other side hopes that Koso­vo will wait a lit­tle bit and dec­la­re its inde­pen­den­ce after the pre­si­den­ti­al elec­ti­ons in Ser­bia. Slo­ve­nia, which will pre­si­de over the Euro­pe­an Uni­on in the first half of 2008, sho­uld have a mis­si­on to discuss with all sides and pre­vent one-sided deci­si­ons. The fear of vio­len­ce in the Bal­kans is too gra­ve, and no one wants to re-expe­ri­en­ce it.

Even if Koso­vo gets con­di­ti­o­nal inde­pen­den­ce, that will not be a fai­ry tale. The main pro­blem will ari­se when they will try to enter the EU, as this will not be pos­si­ble under the sta­tus they are cur­ren­tly see­king. Still, the eth­nic Alba­ni­ans do not want to ack­no­wled­ge that.

In the last fif­te­en years, Euro­pe has had the ten­den­cy of inter­twi­ning all are­as, which has its pros and cons. The Bal­kans has deci­ded to go the oppo­si­te way. I am not cla­i­ming that eit­her of the­se two cho­i­ces is a pri­o­ri unpro­duc­ti­ve and a wrong step. Even still, it is inter­e­sting to obser­ve how one part of Euro­pe is stri­ving to do eve­ryt­hing on the same level and with ligh­te­ning spe­ed, whi­le in the Bal­kans no one is wil­ling to give up the­ir uni­qu­e­ness and per­so­nal visi­ons. Time will show who will sur­vi­ve in the long run.


Tanja Stum­ber­ger — This artic­le was publis­hed in the Tri­bu­nal (in Slo­ve­ni­an) on Decem­ber 20, 2007, in Nova Srp­ska Poli­tič­ka Misao (in Ser­bi­an) on Janu­a­ry 19, 2008, on web­si­te of the Ser­bi­an Govern­ment, Mini­stry for Koso­vo and Meto­hi­ja (in Ser­bi­an) on Janu­a­ry 21, 2008, and in the Glas Koso­vo i Meto­hi­ja (in Ser­bi­an) on Janu­a­ry 31, 2008.